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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The fiscal structure of a federal state like Canada presents many particularities and a number of 
important issues stemming from the existence of various governments on a same national 
territory.  Concurrent taxation is one of these issues and is the matter of interest here.  We can 
define it as occurring when two or more governments use a same type of taxation within a 
country and thus have to share or to compete for a same tax base, at least in part.  As Keen (1998) 
reminds us, we should not talk about concurrent taxation where there is no real power of taxation 
involved.  The governments involved must have discretionary power in fixing their own rate.  It 
is the case of corporate income tax in Canada which is the object of this study. 
 
We analyse the possible existence of tax interaction both between the federal government and the 
provinces and between the provinces.  Concurrent taxation can cause provinces to adjust their tax 
rate in reaction to other players’ choices in fixing their own rates.  It is thus relevant to evaluate if 
and how much the central government or other provincial governments can influence a province 
in determining its tax policy.  As economic theory developed in recent years on the subject 
shows, the existence of fiscal interaction means the presence of fiscal externalities.  These 
externalities are due to a higher or a lower tax rate than the optimal one that could be fixed in 
absence of concurrent taxation.  Vertical externalities are caused by the presence of another level 
of government and generally seen as putting upward pressure on tax rates.  Horizontal 
externalities are caused by the existence of competing provinces that are likely to lead to tax rates 
that are under the optimal. 
 
We also pay attention to other factors that are possible determinants of provincial corporate 
income tax rate.  Transfers from the central government to provinces might have implications on 
decisions in fixing provincial rates.  They are another important source of revenue for 
governments so that higher transfers are expected to put downward pressure on tax rates.  
Equalization entitlements are also a potential factor in determining provinces’ behaviour as they  
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decrease in the case of Canada the cost of higher tax rates1.  They may also have the same effect 
as general transfers. 
The next section of this study is dedicated to a literature review of existing works on tax 
interaction, putting emphasis on those on corporate income tax in Canada.  Section three 
describes the theoretical model used and its implications.  The fourth section of this paper 
presents the empirical implementation, including specification of the model, econometrical 
issues, the data, and a section dedicated to the results.  The last section is the conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  Cavlovic and Day (2003) 
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SECTION I. - LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
1.1  Literature Review 
 
Fiscal federalism is an established field of interest for economists.  In 1972, Wallace E. Oates 
published Fiscal Federalism, a fundamental book that paved the way to much research involving 
the economic structure and realities of federations.  Nevertheless, as Keen (1998) noticed, 
previous work paid little attention to the central government’s roll as an independent entity 
beyond the conventional figure of a master making his appearance to correct distortions among 
members of the federation.  He emphasized the need to “put the Federal into Fiscal Federalism” 
(Keen, 1998) and qualified previous inclusions of the central government in models as 
unsatisfactory.  Since then, much research, theoretical and empirical, has been published dealing 
more directly about concurrent taxation between the two levels of government. 
 
It is true that before Keen’s paper, it is hard to find papers on concurrent taxation and the 
resulting externalities.  The most noticeable exception to that is a mostly qualitative paper by 
Boadway and Vigneault published in 1996 where they try to explain the process by describing 
both vertical and horizontal externalities for business taxes in Canada and their possible 
consequences.  Since 2001, numerous articles examining different taxes, have appeared.   
 
That year, Boadway and Hayashi (2001) built an empirical model to test the existence of fiscal 
interactions between the federal government and the provinces, and the provinces between 
themselves in taxing businesses in Canada.  Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis (2007) later presented  
more recent results and a more complex model of horizontal fiscal interaction for corporate 
income tax rates in Canada.  These two empirical studies will be discussed more in details later in 
this section.  Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002), with a theoretical model, try to evaluate under what 
conditions horizontal or vertical externalities will be dominant.  As they suggest that vertical 
externalities lead to tax rates above the optimal rate and horizontal ones leads to rates under the 
optimal level, the dominant effect should determine if concurrent taxation implies tax rates that 
are too high or too low. 
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Other articles of interest relating to tax interaction in a federation are worth mentioning.   
Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001b), in a similar way as Boadway and Hayashi (2001), found a 
positive response of American states personal income tax rates to the federal one.  Since in the 
studies of Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé there are no particular transformations of the data, it is 
simple and relevant to interpret their estimated coefficients.   They estimate that a 1% variation of 
the central administration rate would lead to a 0,1% change in states’ ones, and that the response 
is around 0,22% when sales taxes are included.  In a different study made the same year, they 
found that Canadian provinces’ positive response to a change of 1% in the federal personal 
income rate was 0,2%, and 0,3% for a 1% variation in competing provinces’ rates (Esteller-Moré 
and Solé-Ollé, 2001a).  Another interesting contribution of that latter study is the consideration of 
equalization payments in Canada, for which a increase of 1% would lead to an increase of 0,2% 
of the provincial rate. 
 
Devereux, Lockwood and Redeano (2007) carried out a similar study for indirect taxes on 
cigarettes and gasoline for the US.  The new interesting element in this study is the central place 
given to transportation costs as a explanatory factor.  Indeed, the explanation of fiscal 
concurrence for indirect taxation is mostly based on those costs and on the elasticity of demand.  
Results show that for cigarettes, which have low transportation costs and for which demand is 
very inelastic, states do not react to an increase of federal tax in fixing their own rate.  In contrast, 
they will strongly react to a change in competing state taxes, as much as an increase of 0,7cent 
for an increase of 1 cent in competing states tax.  For gasoline, less inelastic in demand than 
cigarettes and with higher transportation costs, we see the opposite as the states will react far 
more to a change in the federal tax than to one in competing states taxes. 
 
Other studies explored a different approach from the conventional one.  Boadway, Cuff and 
Marceau (2002), and Dahly and Wilson (2003), consider the possibility of positive vertical 
externalities emerging from concurrent taxation.  The former argue that “allowing regions to 
engage in tax competition for mobile firms may be efficient”, and that the combination of tax and 
public spending may be optimal.  The latter demonstrates, with a theoretical model, that revenues 
from taxation at a sub-national level are used as public spending that increases productivity of the 
factors, labour and capital, from which the central government will benefit by a possible 
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extension of the tax base.  Good examples of such expenses would be education and 
infrastructure.  The sign of the vertical externalities effect could then be either positive or 
negative, depending on what kind of externality dominates the other.  Beyond the level of public 
spending, other factors such as the relative burden of individuals and corporations, the market in 
which they are taxed and the demand elasticity can determine the sign of vertical externalities. 
 
 
1.2  Boadway and Vigneault 
 
Boadway and Vigneault (1996) published a theoretical paper presuming the existence of external 
effects arising from concurrent taxation of business income revenues in Canada.  These 
externalities occur when a government’s fiscal choices have an impact on other governments’ 
budgets.  To explain vertical externalities, they consider provinces as minor players in the 
federation that will not take into account the effects of their choice on the central government’s 
budget.  They will then set a tax rate regardless of the cost for the federal government, resulting 
in a combined rate above the optimal one.  This behaviour might counteract efforts from the 
central administration to decrease the combined business tax rate in Canada in an effort to make 
the fiscal regime more competitive to attract firms.  The authors expect a decrease in the federal 
rate to cause provincial administrations to increase their own rates.  Facing international 
competition, the provinces might have to deal with an implicit limit of the combined tax rates to 
avoid capital  fleeing out of their borders. 
 
Horizontal externalities, on the other side, are the result of the mobility of tax base.  As capital is 
considered as a highly mobile production factor, these externalities are expected to be important 
in the case of corporate income tax.  A decrease in a province’s tax rate makes it more attractive 
to businesses.  A part of the capital in competing provinces might then move to the province with 
the lower rate.  The resulting contraction in the tax base of competing provinces represents a cost 
for them that is not taken into account by the first province in its decision to decrease its tax rate.  
The other side of the equation, public spending, has to be considered too.  Provincial 
governments offer services to businesses that can be another way to compete with their 
neighbours and attract investors.  The authors mention that giving the exclusive right to tax 
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businesses to the central administration would be a way to eliminate the costs related to 
horizontal competition, particularly with a highly mobile tax base. 
 
 
1.3  Hayashi and Boadway 
 
Hayashi and Boadway (2001) made the first empirical study to evaluate fiscal interaction for 
business income taxes between the different government entities in a federation.  They evaluated 
the behaviour of provincial governments in Canada facing a change in federal or competing 
provinces by using reaction functions.  The authors first assume that provincial administrations 
act as Nash competitors that take as given other actors’ decisions in fixing their own rate.  An 
alternative model is also offered in which the federal government is assumed to act as a 
Stackelberg leader, that is the first to move, followed by the provinces.  The model uses three 
sub-national actors, Ontario, Quebec and an aggregate of the eight other provinces.  This decision 
was made due to the fact that few observations are available for each province, thirty-four in this 
case (1963-96), so that according to Hayashi and Boadway (2001), treating each province 
separately was “not feasible”.  In this paper, equalization entitlements are only considered 
indirectly as being a relevant factor, but nothing is included in the model to seize their possible 
effect. 
 
The econometric model used is a VAR with a vector of exogenous variables.  These variables are 
included because they are other factors that might influence the average tax rate while what they 
try to evaluate is the reaction of the province to a variation in other governments’ rate.  Those 
chosen here include inflation, GDP growth rates, interest rates, wages, public sector deficits, and 
even dummies for political parties in power for Quebec, Ontario and Canada.  In the Nash 
system, all four actors’ tax rates are regressed on a lag of their own rate, a lag of each other 
government’s rate and a lag of his own exogenous variables.  The lags come from the assumption 
that the administrations need an adjustment period before reacting.  The main difference in the 
Stackelberg model is that exogenous variables of all three other actors with a lag are included in 
the federal equation.  The federal would then make his decision first based on the evaluation of 
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all other actors’ parameters.  The regression is made by IFGLS (Iterative Feasible Generalized 
Least Squares). 
 
In the Nash model, results show that a raise in federal tax rate will affect negatively Quebec and 
the eight smaller provinces.  This would mean in this case that the necessity to keep the combined 
rate to an acceptable level exceed the need to maintain government revenues from taxation.  
Ontario shows an interesting case as it does not seem influenced by federal choices, but the 
opposite is true.  According to the results, a change in Canada’s largest provincial economy tax 
rate has an incidence on the central administration when fixing its own.  Ontario’s influence in 
the federation is also horizontal.  Both Quebec and the aggregate of other provinces react to a 
variation in the Ontarian rate, and again, the opposite is not true as the nine competing provinces 
have no significant incidence on Ontario’s behaviour.  No significant reaction is perceived 
between Quebec and the eight provinces in either way, which tends to demonstrate that tax 
competition is not important between those provinces. 
 
The results for the Stackelberg model are similar.  No important difference can be discerned 
between the two models’ results, but since the assumptions are not the same, some comments 
should be made about the Stackelberg form.  Theory predicts that exogenous variables that have a 
significant effect for a province will have a significant effect for the federal too, which is not the 
case with the exception of the growth rate in Ontario.  But more importantly, as provinces are 
assumed to act as Nash competitors, we expect to see a significant incidence of the federal rate on 
provincial decisions, which is not the case for Ontario that seems to act as an autonomous player.  
Those remarks bring authors to conclude that Stackelberg model may not be appropriate. 
 
 
1.4  Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis 
 
Like Hayashi and Boadway (2001), Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis (2007) try to evaluate the 
vertical and horizontal effects of concurrent taxation with an interdependent tax setting model by 
using reaction functions.  Nevertheless, the structural approach differs in some points.  The first 
major difference is that they treat all ten provincial governments individually.  An original 
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approach is used to measure horizontal interaction between provinces.  Three distinct criterions 
are implemented with spatial weight matrices to catch effects of horizontal competition: a 
distance-based, an inverse distance-based and a k-neighbour criterion.  These alternatives allow 
analysis for different hypotheses in the structure of competition for capital between provinces.  
All three possibilities, nevertheless, are based on the assumption that geography within the 
country has a major influence on capital mobility, which is not certain and may depend on the 
nature of investments considered.  In this study, the federal government is not assumed to react to 
a province’s change in corporate tax rate.  Variations in its tax rate are considered exclusively as 
an explicative factor for province’s behaviour.  Also, equalization entitlements are this time taken 
into account explicitly with the inclusion of a specific variable in the model. 
 
The regression is made by IWTSLS-IL (Iterative Weighted Two-Stage Least Squares with 
Instrumental Variables).  As mentioned, the federal tax rate is exclusively treated as an 
independent variable here.  The regression is run for each province independently on one lag of 
their own rate, one lag of the federal rate, the geographically weighted variable of competing 
provinces contemporarily and with one lag, one lag of equalization entitlements, one lag of other 
federal transfers, and a vector of exogenous variables including inflation rate, per capita wages, 
unemployment rate and population density.  Exogenous variables have the same purpose as in the 
previously reported study, trying to control for possible external impact on provincial tax rates.  
Data are collected for years 1961-1996. 
 
As the distance-based and the inverse distance-based criterion produce very similar results, the 
latter is not developed.  Results conflict in many respects with those of Hayashi and Boadway 
(2001).  First, all horizontal interactions are found to be contemporaneous since no significant 
relations were found with a temporal lag of the neighbours variables.  Also, Ontario seems to be 
highly reactive to his neighbours’ rates under both criterions, while it was considered in the other 
study as highly autonomous.  Quebec’s rate is also significantly influenced by those of its 
neighbours under both criterions, but with smaller magnitude than Ontario’s.  These results make 
the authors assume that Ontario and Quebec have a strong dependency link in choosing their 
fiscal policies with respect to corporate income tax.  Manitoba, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward 
Island also respond to neighbours’ changes in tax rates, but only under the k-neighbour criterion. 
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The responses of provincial administrations to a change in the federal rate with a temporal lag are 
all significant and negative, but with great coefficient variations from one to another.  Again 
contrasting with Boadway and Hayashi (2001) results, Ontario is highly reactive to a change from 
the central government.  These results tend to show great influence of a federal government’s 
decisions and are robust under all spatial criterions implemented.  As the literature suggests that 
equalization entitlements might cause provinces to increase their tax rate due to the fact that they 
do not assume the entire cost of this policy, contemporaneous equalization payments turn out to 
be insignificant.  Nevertheless, the variable with one lag gives a significant negative coefficient, 
which is inconsistent with the theory.  A possible explication advanced by the authors is that 
equalization entitlements received the preceding year can be used to set lower rates in a 
competitive perspective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10
Table 1 - Literature Review Summary 
 
Study Subject Variables Population Years Estimation method Results 
Hayashi 
and 
Boadway 
(2001) 
Business 
income tax 
interaction 
in Canada 
Dependent: logit scaled federal 
tax rate, logit scaled Quebec's, 
Ontario's and an aggregate of 8 
other Canadian provinces' tax 
rates                                               
Independent: a lag of logit scaled 
competing provinces' and 
federals' tax rates, exogenous 
variables including dummies for 
party in power, ratio of deficit to 
GDP, log of per-capita wages, 
GDP growth rate, Inflation rate, 
capital utilization rate, 
international interest rate 
Federal 
government, 
governments 
of Quebec, 
Ontario and 
an aggregate 
of 8 other 
Canadian 
provinces 
1963-
1996 
VAR 
(Variable 
Auto-
Regressive) 
model             
IFGLS 
(Iterated 
Feasible 
Generalized 
Least 
Square)        
Quebec's and 8 smaller 
provinces' rates are 
affected negatively by 
the federal rate   
Ontario's rate affects 
positively other 
provinces' and federal 
rates and is not 
affected by any               
Quebec's and the 
aggregate of 8 
provinces' tax rate have 
no incidence on each 
other 
Esteller-
Moré 
and 
Solé-
Ollé 
(2001a)  
Personal 
income tax 
interaction 
in Canada 
Dependent: Provincial average 
effective tax rate                             
Independent: Federal average 
effective tax rate, competing 
provinces tax rate, dummies for 
equalization beneficiary, Ontario, 
Quebec, Atlantic provinces and 
Western provinces entitled to 
receive equalization, Personal 
income component of GDP, 
General purpose transfers, Other 
transfers, Natural resources, 
provincial population, % 
population over 65, % population 
under 15, Unemployment rate, 
dummy for a left wing party in 
power, dummy for a provincial 
government governing in minority 
in Parliament 
10 Canadian 
provinces 
1982-
1996 
Fixed effects 
model by 
OLS 
An increase of 1% in 
federal tax rate is 
followed by an increase 
of about 0,2% in 
provincial ones               
An increase of 1% in 
competing provinces 
rate is followed by an 
increase of about 0,3%
Esteller-
Moré 
and 
Solé-
Ollé 
(2001b)  
Personal 
income tax 
interaction 
in the US 
Dependent: State effective 
income tax rate, State effective 
income tax rate plus sales 
average tax rate        
Independent: Federal effective tax 
rate, dummy for state where 
deductibility of federal income 
taxes is allowed, Personal income 
per capita, Federal grants per 
capita, State population, Density 
of population, Proportion of 
population over 65, Proportion of 
population under 18, dummies for 
States' tax base definition and if 
Governor and Senators are 
Democrats 
41 US States 
that have a 
broad-based 
income tax 
1987-
1996 
OLS with 
time effects 
An increase of 1% in 
federal tax rate is 
followed by an increase 
of about 0,1% in states' 
rates and 0,22% when 
average sale tax is 
included 
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Study Subject Variables Population Years Estimation method Results 
Karkalak
os and 
Kotsogia
nnis 
(2007) 
Corporate 
income tax 
interaction 
in Canada 
Dependent: Provincial average 
effective tax rate                             
Independent: Temporal lag of 
federal average effective tax rate, 
Competing provinces tax rate 
contemporaneous and with one 
lag, Temporal lag of Federal 
transfers, Temporal lag of 
equalization entitlements, Per 
capita wages, Inflation rate, 
Population density, 
Unemployment rate 
10 Canadian 
provinces 
1961-
1996 
IWTSLS-IL 
(Iterative 
Weighted 
Two-Stage 
Least 
Squares 
with 
Instrumental 
Variables).   
Positive 
contemporaneous 
responses of some 
provinces to competing 
provinces' rates 
including Ontario, 
Quebec, Manitoba, 
Nova Scotia and Prince 
Edward Island              
Negative response of 
all Canadian provinces 
to a on lag variation in 
federal tax rate 
Devereu
x, 
Lockwo
od and 
Redeano 
(2007)  
Indirect 
taxes on 
cigarettes 
and 
gasoline 
interaction 
in the US 
Dependent: Provincial indirect tax 
rate on cigarettes and gasoline      
Independent: Federal tax rate, 
competing States' rate, Federal 
GDP, State GDP, Population, 
Proportion of young, Proportion of 
Old, Unemployment, Income per 
capita, Income tax rate, Grant per 
capita, Gas production, Tobacco 
production, Dept, Inflation rate, 
political dummies 
48 US States 1977-1997 OLS-IV 
For cigarettes, indirect 
tax rate is strongly 
affected by a change in 
competing states' rates 
but not by federal one.   
For gasoline, tax rate is 
strongly affected by 
federal rate but not by 
competing states' ones
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SECTION II. – THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
2.1  Theoretical Model 
 
The theoretical basis for this paper, considers a country with only two provinces and a central 
government, the latter using the same business tax rate for both members of the federation.  The 
model used here is based on Hayashi and Boadway (2001).  The firms’ revenues net from taxes 
can be represented as follows: 
 
P1 = (1 – t1 – T) F1` (K1)   et   p2 = (1 – t2 – T) F2` (K2) 
 
Where p1 and p2 represent the firms’ revenues net of taxes for each of the two provinces, t1 and t2 
represent the effective business average tax rate of the provinces, T is the federal effective 
business average tax rate and F(K) is the part of production attributed to capital.  Assuming 
perfect mobility of capital and thus eliminating the need for adjustment costs in the model, we 
have at equilibrium: 
 
(1 – t1 – T) F1`(K1) = (1 – t2 – T) F2`(K2) = r 
 
where r is the international tax rate net of taxes.  We suppose the following conditions to hold:  
 
∂K1/∂t1 < 0 
∂K1/∂t2 > 0 
∂K1,2/∂T < 0 
 
The governments value both revenues from business tax and the quantity of capital present on 
their territory.  Revenue is defined as Rf = Tf F(K1 + K2) for the federal government, and R1,2 = t1,2 
F1,2 (K1,2) for the provincial governments.  Capital is defined as K1 and K2 for the provinces 
where Ki = Ki (t1, t2, T, r), and K1 + K2 for the central administration.  Each government wants to 
maximize a utility function that takes into account both variables (K and R), which gives us: 
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max Vf [Rf, K1 + K2] s.c. Rf = Tf F(K1 + K2) et Ki =  Ki (t1, t2, T, r) for the central government 
max V1,2[R1,2, K1,2] s.c. R1,2=t1,2F1,2(K1,2) et Ki = Ki (t1, t2, T, r) for the provinces 
 
 
This theoretical explanation is developed in a simplified manner in order to illustrate the 
intuition, the empirical model however as well as the implementation, have numerous variables 
and illustrate some important differences from the theoretical analysis.  
 
 
2.2  Comments 
 
Because we include both the revenues from taxes and the quantity of capital in the territory of a 
given government in their utility function, the latter being equivalent to a measure of the tax base 
for that administration, different results are theoretically possible.  Revenues from business tax 
are affected by two elements: the tax rate chosen and the size of the tax base, the latter being 
affected by the combined federal-provincial tax rate.  An increase in the provincial tax rate 
should lead to a reduction of the tax base because of the effects of horizontal competition.  This 
contraction affects negatively the provincial government’s revenues however the elevated tax rate 
has the opposite effect.  Figure 1 shows a net loss of total revenues for the combined two levels 
of government (area B+D).  However, as mentioned before, provinces do not consider the 
potentially negative effects of their decisions on the federal government’s revenue when 
increasing their rates.  The loss of revenues for a provincial government corresponds to area B, 
while area E corresponds to the gain resulting from the increase in tax rate.  Whether the net 
effect on the revenues is positive or negative depends on the sensibility of capital to marginal 
taxation, the final output is not clear.   
 
The decrease of the quantity of capital on its territory clearly has a negative effect on the 
governments’ utility, but the effect on the revenue variation is ambiguous.  Theoretically, if we 
suppose that the utility of the government is largely affected by his tax revenues and that capital 
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Figure 1 – Effects of an Increase in Provincial Tax Rate 
 
 
Source : Boadway and Vigneault (1996) 
 
 
 
is relatively not sensible to a change in tax rate, the final output could be an increase in the 
provincial administration utility.  However, an increase in the federal tax rate corresponds to a 
higher combined tax rate which affects negatively both the tax base and the quantity of capital for 
the provinces.  Under the circumstances where capital is not sensible to a variation in tax rate and 
revenues affect more strongly the provincial government utility than quantity of capital, it is 
possible that the loss of provincial tax revenues from an increase in the federal tax rate may be 
compensated for by an increase in the provincial rate.  This possibility would imply that a 
 15
provincial government does not take into account vertical externalities as shown in figure 1, 
where we see a gain of revenues for the province, but the combined federal-provincial effect is a 
loss in tax revenues. 
 
The explanation can also be extended to the inter-provincial effects.  The reduction of another 
province’s tax rate implies a decrease in revenues for one provincial administration since a part of 
the tax base will be lost to the province instating the reduce tax rate.  A province whose utility 
function is more affected by revenues than quantity of capital may increase its own tax rate in 
response to the other province decrease to compensate the loss of revenues.  Nevertheless, a 
decrease in a province tax rate is more likely to be responded to by a decrease in the other 
province tax rate, as anticipated by the horizontal fiscal competition theory.  Overall, the various 
studies do observe a phenomenon of horizontal competition between provinces implying positive 
responses to a variation in neighbours’ business tax rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION III. – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
3.1  Model Specifications 
 
 
The relatively small number of observations requires caution with respect to some possible 
issues.  We have available only 24 annual observation (1981-2004), and an even smaller 
population of 10 provinces.  This calls for particular attention to potential problems of non-
stationarity of the series.  The basic empirical model takes the following form: 
 
PROVRATEi,t = αt + βi,tFEDRATE i,t + ηi,tCOMPROVi,t + δi,tEQUALIZATIONi,t + 
γi,t-1FEDTRANSFERSi,t-1 +  λtZt + μi,t 
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where β and η are reaction parameters representing the effect of the change in the tax rate of the 
federal and competing provinces respectively.  δi,t takes a value of 1 if provinces t  benefits from 
equalization entitlements for year i, 0 if not.  λt is a vector of estimators for the effects of 
exogenous variables described above (for a complete list, see table 3.4).  Some modifications had 
to be made to deal with different issues including, as expected, non-stationarity of tax variables 
series, but also heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous and serial correlation.  We now report the 
steps followed to detect and handle these issues. 
 
 
3.1.1  Individual effects 
 
Individual effects are effects that are specific to each individual and do not change over time.  
Given the presence of individual effects reported by STATA, we use the classic tests of Hausman 
to determine the most appropriate form to correct these.  The rejection of the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient controlling for fixed or random effects are not systematically different does not 
allow us to use the random effects method because the estimator would be biased.  As long as the 
level form is involved, we will have to use “within” estimators.  This method has two main 
disadvantages.  First, we lose N-1 (9) degree of liberty and since the number of observations we 
have is small the efficiency of estimators is reduced.  Also, as our dummy variable for 
equalization is very stable over time in terms of its association with specific provinces, its 
possible its effect on our dependent variable will be hard to measure  is not likely to be perceived 
anymore.2 
 
 
3.1.2  Stationarity and Cointegration 
 
As was mentioned before, problems of non-stationarity necessitate particular attention since we 
consider a relatively long period compared to the size of our population (T > N).  Other problems 
such as contemporaneous correlation might have been considered as more damaging for a similar 
                                                 
2 Only Ontario, Saskatchewan and British Colombia experimented changes in their status of beneficiary of 
equalization payments or not, other provinces have coefficients equal to zero. 
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study conducted in United States where the population of  States is considerably larger.  We can 
observe results of unit root tests made with RATS in table 2. 
 
 
Table 2 – Stationary Tests Results (level form) 
 
Levin Lin IPS 
Variables Trend t-rho ADF ADF 
PROVRATE No Does not reject H0 Does not reject H0 Reject H0 at 5% 
FEDRATE No Does not reject H0 Does not reject H0 Does not reject H0 
COMPROV No Does not reject H0 Does not reject H0 Does not reject H0 
FEDTRANSFERS Yes Reject H0 at 5% Reject H0 at 5% Reject H0 at 5% 
GDP Yes Does not reject H0 Does not reject H0 Reject H0 at 5% 
WAGES Yes Does not reject H0 Does not reject H0 Does not reject H0 
INFLATION No Reject H0 at 5% Reject H0 at 5% Reject H0 at 5% 
UNEMPL No Reject H0 at 5% Reject H0 at 5% Reject H0 at 5% 
HO: unit root 
 
 
The results reported are those produced by Levin and Lin both with t-rho and Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller, and by Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) tests with the inclusion of a time dummy.  If we 
cannot reject H0, we suppose the presence of a unit root, and thus non-stationarity.  As expected, 
the three tax variable series are found to be non-stationary for all three tests with the exception of 
PROVRATE for which we reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for the IPS test.  
WAGES and GDP are the only non-tax variable for which we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
for all the tests.  These results come from the decision to use nominal per capita GDP and wages 
as the data has been shown to be stationary when indexed to inflation3. 
 
Using the logarithmic form of the variables does not help to solve the problem.  As we can see in 
table 3, we cannot reject the null hypothesis for any variable except for INFLATION and 
UNEMPL.  There exist other problems related to the use of logarithmic form.  In common 
regressions with OLS controlled for fixed effects, variable LOGNEIGHBOUR was found to have 
a significant negative coefficient which would mean that a decrease in a competing province’s 
                                                 
3 Revenues from corporate income tax and the tax base are nominal values, and thus nominal per capita GDP and 
wages are more appropriate for analytical purposes 
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tax rate would cause a province to increase its own rate.  This is a very unlikely situation that is 
inconsistent with other results we produced (see Results section), with economic theory and with 
previous empirical studies, even though as a non-linear transformation logarithmic form is likely 
 
Table 3 – Stationary Tests Results (logarithmic form) 
 
Levin Lin IPS 
Variables (logarithmic) Trend t-rho ADF ADF 
PROVRATE No Does not reject H0 Does not reject H0 Does not reject H0 
FEDRATE No Does not reject H0 Does not reject H0 Does not reject H0 
COMPROV No Does not reject H0 Does not reject H0 Does not reject H0 
FEDTRANSFERS Yes/No Does not reject H0 Does not reject H0 Does not reject H0 
GDP Yes/No Does not reject H0 Does not reject H0 Does not reject H0 
WAGES Yes/No Does not reject H0 Does not reject H0 
Reject H0 at 5% / 
Does not reject H0 
INFLATION No Reject H0 at 5% Reject H0 at 5% Reject H0 at 5% 
UNEMPL No Reject H0 at 5% Reject H0 at 5% Reject H0 at 5% 
HO: unit root 
 
 
to produce such results statistically.  Thus, results are not reported for the logarithmic form.  This 
leaves us two options to overcome non-stationarity in our series. 
 
A first option we have to deal with non-stationary series is to see if those variables are 
cointegrated.  If they are, we can use the option of Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) to 
overcome the problem.  Our series follow the same stochastic tendency which means that our 
estimators are convergent.  RATS calculates cointegration tests using various alternative 
statistics.  Results are provided in table 4.  The panel statistics are within-dimension based while 
the group statistics are between-dimension based (Morand Perreault, 2007).  As we can observe, 
it is hard to be conclusive about the results of these tests since more conservative ones do not 
reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration.  In a small population sample, the rejection of null 
hypothesis for the group rho-stat should be conclusive that we have a cointegration relation, 
which is not the case here (Pedroni, 2004).  
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Similar results are found when we try to test fewer variables for possible cointegration relations.  
The exception is when the tests are conducted for PROVRATE alone with FEDRATE where we 
can reject the null hypothesis for all seven statistics.  Nevertheless, the use of estimation methods 
considering this relationship and including other non-stationary series in the regression would 
hardly be relevant for identification purposes.  Even though we cannot conclude on the existence  
 
Table 4 – Cointegration Tests Results 
 
Variables (logarithmic) 
Cointegration tests for PROVRATE, FEDRATE, 
COMPROV, WAGES AND GDP 
panel v-stat Does not reject H0 
panel rho-stat Does not reject H0 
panel pp-stat Reject H0 at 5% 
panel adf-stat Reject H0 at 5% 
group rho-stat Does not reject H0 
group pp-stat Reject H0 at 5% 
group adf-stat Reject H0 at 5% 
HO: no cointegration 
 
 
of  a cointegration relation between all non-stationary variables, results provided give us good 
insight into the likelihood of a cointegration relation.  Thus, we provide results obtained from 
DOLS regression.  It is risky anyway to use these since observations are lost for each lag or 
future value of first difference included in the regression.  Because our sample is already small, 
we have chosen to use the first difference and one lag of it for each cointegrated independent 
variable.  We compared the results obtained with different possible combinations of lags and 
advances to be sure this choice will not affect the validity of the results.  We still lose 2 
observations for each province with this method in addition to the one lost because of the need to 
use a fixed-effects model.  We then drop to only 21 annual observations for each province. 
 
The second choice we have is to use estimation methods under the first difference form.  The 
interpretation of the coefficients will then become the impact of a variation of an independent 
variable (ex. FEDRATE) on the variation of the dependant variable (PROVRATE).  The model 
then takes the following form: 
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Δ PROVRATEi,t = αt + βi,tΔ FEDRATE i,t + ηi,tΔ COMPROVi,t + 
δi,tEQUALIZATIONi,t + γi,tΔ FEDTRANSFERSi,t-1 +  λtΔ Zt + εi,t 
 
 
The first difference form causes the unit root parameter to disappear and thus the model becomes 
stationary.  Nevertheless, exogenous variables significance in explaining the provincial tax rates 
variations is likely to be lost, which is the cost of using this form in our analysis.  Even 
considering this ultimate possibility, the first difference form is still likely to be our best option to 
deal with non-stationarity problems. 
 
 
3.1.3  Heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous and serial correlation 
 
Various tests operated in STATA helped us to specify the best estimation method considering the 
possible addition of heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation and serial correlation 
problems to our stationarity problem.  In a way to identify the changes that might occur in 
correcting for those problems, the tests have been made in all three forms, level, logarithmic, and 
first difference. 
 
A Breush-Pagan test is used to detect heteroskedasticity.  Under the null hypothesis, residual 
terms are homoscedastic.  Should the null hypothesis be rejected, an additional test must be run to 
specify the form of this heteroskedasticity, to see if there is inter-individual heteroskedasticity.  
Such a test is operated systematically by STATA with the command “xttest2” where the rejection 
of the null hypothesis helps us to conclude that there is intra-individual heteroskedasticity, which 
does not exclude the presence of inter-individual form of heteroskedasticity.  If we do not reject 
H0, then we can conclude that only the former is present if the null hypothesis is rejected for the 
first test. 
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Contemporaneous correlation is detected by another Breush-Pagan test under which rejection of 
the null hypothesis leads us to the conclusion that there is no such correlation.  The presence of 
serial correlation is detected by a Wooldridge test.  Under the null hypothesis we can conclude 
that there is no first-order correlation.  In table 5 are summarized all the results provided by these 
tests for the three forms, and results for the Hausman test to determine if we must use a fixed-
effects model or a random-effects model. 
 
We see that for the level form, all the problems mentioned are found in the data.  This is useful 
for the DOLS method to correct those problems.  With the command XTGLS, we can take into 
account the presence of first-order serial correlation, cross-sectional correlation and 
heteroskedasticity.  All these combined problems are controlled for using a Feasible Generalized 
Least Squares (FGLS) regression specifying the corrections we want to impose in STATA.  
Similar results were found for the logarithmic form for which all the null hypothesis are rejected.   
 
Some changes in the test results occurred in the first difference transformations.  We still have to 
deal with heteroskedasticity problems and cross-sectional correlation in data.  The null hypothesis 
of no serial correlation in the data is no longer rejected though, so we do not have to concern 
ourselves with this correction in regressing first differences of our variables.  Also, we do not 
reject the null hypothesis that residuals and explicative variables are independent.  This means 
that both the “within” and the “between” estimators are unbiased and thus, we can use a random-
effects model.  Nevertheless, the presence of heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation 
leads us to choose a GLS regression with appropriate corrections.  We can note that STATA 
operates the same first differences regression with the OLS with random-effects model as with 
the GLS without additional specifications model.  As only the former allow us corrective 
functions for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation, this estimation method is the 
natural choice for our concerns. 
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Table 5 – Tests Results Summary 
 
Level form Logarithmic form First difference form 
Tests Result Conclusion Result Conclusion Result Conclusion 
Heteroskedasticity 
test (Breusch-
Pagan)                 
H0: 
homoscedasticity 
Reject H0 
at 5% Heteroskedasticity
Reject H0 
at 5% Heteroskedasticity 
Reject H0 
at 5% Heteroskedasticity
Heteroskedasticity 
inter-individual 
(xttest2)           
H0:homoscedasticity 
intra-individual 
Reject H0 
at 5% 
Heteroskedasticity 
intra-individual 
Reject H0 
at 5% 
Heteroskedasticity 
intra-individual 
Reject H0 
at 5% 
Heteroskedasticity 
intra-individual 
Contemporaneous 
correlation test 
(Breusch-Pagan)       
H0: no cross-
sectional correlation 
Reject H0 
at 5% Tests 
Reject H0 
at 5% 
Contemporaneous 
correlation 
Reject H0 
at 5% 
Contemporaneous 
correlation 
Serial correlation 
test (Wooldridge)       
H0: no first-order 
correlation 
Reject H0 
at 5% Serial correlation 
Reject H0 
at 5% Serial correlation 
Does not 
reject H0 
No serial 
correlation 
Fixed of random 
effects (Hausman 
test)              
H0:independence 
between residuals 
and independent 
variables 
Reject H0 
at 10% 
We use a fixed 
effects model 
Reject H0 
at 10% 
We use a fixed 
effects model 
Does not 
reject H0 
We use a random 
effects model 
 
 
 
3.1.4  Endogeneity 
 
The last econometric issue we need to consider is potential problems of endogeneity for the tax 
variables, COMPROV and FEDRATE.  The first test operated is the Nakamura-Nakamura test 
for endogeneity.  Essentially, we regress the endogenous variable on exogenous and instrumental 
variables, recuperate the residuals which we include in the original regression.  If the student 
statistic shows that the residual variable is insignificant, we reject the hypothesis of endogeneity.  
The second test is a classic Hausman test for validity of instruments.  Under the null hypothesis, 
the difference in the two models, with and without instrumental variables, is not significant. 
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A natural instrumental variable to include in this test is a lag of the endogenous variable.  This 
instrument is considered to be correlated with tax variables in time t and should fix the problem 
of correlation between the original variable and residuals of the regression.  Thus, tests have been 
run using a lag of the federal tax rate and a lag of competing provinces’ weighted average rate.  
We ran additional tests using a different instrument for FEDRATE.  The average effective 
corporate income tax rate of the federal government in all Canada was a potential candidate.  As 
tax bases are largely similar for federal and provincial governments within a province, the general 
federal rate could have been a good way to evaluate federal behaviour in setting his tax rate. 
 
Both tests described below were used on variables in their first difference form, which possibly 
fixes our endogeneity problem, if there is any.  Results show that this is the case here.  The first 
test was not conclusive for COMPROV as we could not reject the null hypothesis at a confidence 
level of 10%.  The variable FEDPROV did not show evidence of endogeneity after proceeding to 
the Nakamura-Nakamura test using either a lagged value of the variable or the general federal tax 
rate in Canada.  The second test was done as well on both variables to evaluate the validity of the 
chosen instruments.  In the three cases, we clearly could not reject the null hypothesis and we 
then concluded that the potential instruments are not useful.  The DOLS method eliminates the 
need for testing for endogeneity problems, consequently there is no need to run these tests in the 
level form for our second regression. 
 
 
 
3.2  Data 
 
3.2.1 Tax Variables 
 
Businesses in Canada deal with a complex fiscal system.  For instance, small businesses in 
Canada, by both the federal and all ten provincial governments, can count with favourable 
policies such as a preferential rate and other deductions.  Other differentiating treatments have 
been given to manufacturing and processing businesses during the years covered in the present 
study. Depreciating methods and allowances are another example of tools governments can use 
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as incentives to influence corporate activities in Canada.  In this respect, average effective rate 
are a good way to summarize all those different treatments within the country or the provinces. 
 
Nevertheless, while capturing differentiations in the taxation regime, other realities concerning 
capital mobility between provinces that should be considered are not.  Some provinces offer 
particular services or favours that give them an additional advantage in attracting firms.  For 
instance, Quebec charges electricity rates below the general price to aluminum producing 
companies which impacts on some firm’s decision to invest in that province.  Also, economic 
theory generally focuses on the marginal rate, not the average rate, to be the determinant factor in 
firm’s investment decisions.  Devereux et Griffith (1998) argue in favour of average tax rates 
supposing that once firms decided to enter a foreign market, average tax rates are more important 
in the choice of a production location.   
 
Average effective tax rates depend on two elements: direct taxes revenues from corporations and 
government enterprises, and the tax base, which are the corporate profits before taxes.  Both are 
collected from CANSIM in provincial economic accounts.  Horizontal interactions are measured 
by a weighted average of all nine other provinces’ rates for each province.  The relative 
importance of each province in the variable is exclusively determined by its proportion in the 
total GDP of the nine provinces.  This contrasts with Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis’ (2007) 
geographical criterions approach but is consistent with Hayashi and Boadway’s (2001) one.  We 
operate under the assumption that geographical considerations are not relevant for capital 
considering its high mobility but economic activity is.  Theory is not clear on whether distance 
must be taken into account for investment location decisions within a federation or not. 
 
Table 6 – Data Description and Source, 1981-2004, Canada 
 
Variable Definition Source 
PROVRATE Provincial average effective corporate 
income tax rate as a proportion of direct 
taxes from corporations and governments 
business enterprises on corporate profits 
 
Provincial economic 
accounts, CANSIM, 
Statistics Canada 
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Variable Definition Source 
FEDRATE Federal average effective corporate income 
tax rate in each province as a proportion of 
direct taxes from corporations and 
governments business enterprises on 
corporate profits 
 
Provincial economic 
accounts, CANSIM, 
Statistics Canada 
NEIGHBOUR Weighted average of competing provinces’ 
average effective corporate income tax rate 
as a proportion of direct taxes from 
corporations and governments business 
enterprises on corporate profits 
 
Provincial economic 
accounts, CANSIM, 
Statistics Canada 
 
 
FEDTRANSFERS Per capita current transfers from federal 
government to provinces 
Provincial economic 
accounts, CANSIM, 
Statistics Canada 
 
EQUAL =1 if province receive equalization  
payments in specific year 
 
Finances of the Nation, 
Canadian Tax Foundation 
WAGES Per capita wages, salaries and 
supplementary labour income 
Provincial economic 
accounts, CANSIM, 
Statistics Canada 
GDP Per capita GDP, 1997 constant prices Provincial economic 
accounts, CANSIM, 
Statistics Canada 
INFLATION Inflation rate calculated from CPI based on 
a 2001 basket content, 1992=100 
 
CANSIM, Statistics 
Canada 
UNEMPL Official unemployment rate Labour  force survey 
estimates (LFS), CANSIM, 
Statistics Canada 
 
 
 
In Figure 2 and 3, we observe the evolution of provincial effective rates for eastern and western 
provinces respectively.  We note some common movements in different provincial rates that may 
be an indication of the presence of horizontal competition.  Nevertheless, these variations can 
possibly be attributed to changes in corporate profits induced by the business cycle.  This shows 
the importance of including exogenous variables to capture external effects of the business cycle 
as discussed below.   
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Figure 2 – Average Effective Corporate Income Tax Rate – Eastern Canadian Provinces (1981-
2004) 
Average Effective Corporate Income Tax Rate - Eastern Provinces
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Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Provincial economic accounts 
 
Figure 3 – Average Effective Corporate Income Tax Rate – Western Canadian Provinces (1981-
2004) 
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Figures 4 and 5 helps us to understand some facts about the average tax rates patterns.  We 
should note that the values used in these figures, unlike those used to calculate average tax rates, 
are deflated4 for inflation in order to simplify their interpretation.    Generally speaking, 
movements in tax rates seem to be the opposite of those of the tax bases.  In the beginning of the 
1990’s, tax bases commonly shrank following a period of economic slowdown characterized by 
negative growth rates for most of the Canadian provinces.  In contrast, a higher proportion of 
corporate profits was taxed by provincial governments in those years, which tends to demonstrate 
that governmental revenues are not affected in the same proportion as corporate profits when the 
economy experiences a slowdown.  The opposite is also true as the following years were 
characterized by growing corporate profits while average rates tended to decrease.  Thus, we can 
reasonably conclude that the tax base is more responsive to business cycles than revenues from 
corporate income tax, and thus a bias could be appear if exogenous variables were omitted. 
 
 
Figure 4 – Provincial Corporate Tax Base – Eastern Canadian Provinces (1981-2004) 
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4 Deflated using Consumer price index, CANSIM series #326-0002, Statistics Canada (2001 basket content, year 
1992=100) 
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Figure 5 - Provincial Corporate Tax Base – Western Canadian Provinces (1981-2004) 
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We use federal average effective rates on corporate income tax are built the same way as 
provincial ones.  They are based on federal government revenues from corporate tax in each 
province separately.  The tax base is derived from corporate profits calculated identically at both 
the federal and provincial levels.  Even though three provinces, Ontario, Quebec and Alberta, 
administer their own corporate tax, they use a relatively similar tax base as the federal 
government.  For the other seven provinces, tax bases are consistent with the federal ones. 
 
The period considered in the present study has been characterized by a commitment of the federal 
government to reduce the tax burden of businesses to promote investment.  The statutory rates 
have been decreasing constantly since 1981 for all kinds of businesses as we can observe in table 
7.  The general business rate decreased from 46% to 21% between 1981 and 2004, while the 
small business’ lower rate threshold increased from 200 000$ to 250 000$ during the same 
period.   
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The results of that policy can be observed in figure 6 where we see the federal corporate tax 
revenues and tax base for the whole country.  The data shown does not correspond to that which 
Table 7 – Statutory Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates in Canada, Selected Years, 1981-2004 
 
Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates, Selected Years, 1981 to 2004 
Statutory tax rates  
Type of business 1981 1987 2003 2004 
General business 46% 36% 23% 21% 
Manufacturing and processing 40% 30% 21% 21% 
Natural resources N/A 36% 27% 26% 
Investment income N/A 36% 28% 28% 
Small business rate 25% 15% 12% 12% 
Threshold 200 000$ 200 000 $ 225 000 $ 250 000 $ 
 
Source: Finances of the Nation, 1981-82 and 2005, Canadian Tax Foundation 
 
 
Figure 6 – Federal Corporate Tax Revenues and Tax Base, Canada (1981-
2004)
Federal Tax Revenues and Tax Base
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we use, namely it is not separated by province, but is relevant to evaluate the central 
administration behaviour globally.  The same phenomenon as with provincial rates can be 
observed at the federal level, that the tax base is a lot more responsive to business cycle than tax 
revenues.  It is clear also that the average effective federal rate decrease corresponds to an 
increase in the tax base while policies of lowering statutory rates by the government result in a 
very modest increase of tax revenues from corporations. 
 
 
3.2.2  Other Variables 
 
Average marginal corporate income tax rates are the common tool used to predict provincial 
governments’ policies since changes in those rates allow us to distinguish governments’ reactions 
to federal and competing provinces’ ones.  Nevertheless, they are not perfect indicators of these 
behaviours and for this reason, we have to include other external factors that have an impact on 
these rates. 
 
Provinces’ fiscal capacity is evaluated under 33 tax bases that are compared to national standards 
calculated by an average of five representative provinces, Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba.  The program has been amended since, but the period we cover in 
this study is not concerned by the changes. 
 
Equalization entitlements is a variable of interest because of the possible “tax-back effect”.  
Because revenues from equalization are affected by an eventual increase in the size of a tax base, 
it is suspected that equalization system might cause disincentive to reduce tax rates.  We use a 
dummy variable to see if there is a difference in behaviours of beneficiary and non-beneficiary 
provinces.  The decision to use a dummy instead of actual numbers was made based on two 
results.  First, Calvolic and Day (2003) found that there is no empirical evidence of a “tax-back 
effect” and thus provinces do not seem to deliberately adopt policies that could negatively affect 
their tax bases.  Second, Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis (2007) found no evidence of a 
contemporaneous relationship between equalization payments received and provincial average 
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effective rates as we mentioned before.  Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis (2007) assume the rates are 
influenced by one year retarded entitlements and thus can be treated as general federal transfers.  
If current transfers from federal government are such that they impact provincial rates, then we 
may conclude, as Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis (2007), that lagged equalization payments have a 
similar impact. 
 
Federal transfers per capita, are considered relevant because they negatively affect provincial tax 
rates.  Higher transfers increase provinces’ revenues and put downward pressure on their rates.  
The variable is lagged by one year as transfers should be considered as lump-sum payments that 
will affect governments’ positions the following year. 
 
Other variables are expected to have an effect on average effective provincial rates.  GDP per 
capita, inflation rate and wages per capita must be considered as indicators of the business cycle, 
which influence corporate profits, and are external to provincial administrations’ behaviours.  
Inflation is also relevant as the tax base is not indexed for inflation.  The unemployment rate is 
considered to account for the possibility that the production factor “labour” might be 
underemployed.  International interest rates, captured in previous work (Hayashi and Boadway 
(2001), Karkalakos and Kotsigiannis (2007)) by nominal rates on U.S. municipal bonds, have 
been voluntarily omitted since the variable was not considered as significant in the preceding 
studies mentioned.  We note that per capita GDP, wages and federal transfers are not indexed for 
inflation because nominal values of the tax base and corporate income tax revenues are used to 
calculate average tax rates. 
 
 
3.3  Results 
 
Running two different regressions for our model offers a good way to be more secure about our 
conclusions.  The first difference approach calculates how changes in tax rate variations from one 
year to another are correlated between provinces and federal rates.  While the first difference 
form interpretation is more difficult than with a level regression, all econometric problems 
mentioned above have been taken into account.  The resulting coefficients are still useful to 
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analyse since their relative magnitude and significance reveal which variables have an impact on 
the provincial average tax rates and the relative importance of those factors. 
 
The DOLS method used with Feasible GLS also offer us a regression free of major econometric 
problems.  Nevertheless, the small number of periods considered limits us in the implementation 
of this method.  The advantage here is that the coefficients will be much easier to analyse.  It 
directly calculates the effect of a change in federal or competing provinces’ rate on provincial 
ones.  The most important thing is that, as it can be seen in table 8, results of such different forms 
of regression are consistent, and so we can conclude that these results are robust to such 
transformations. 
 
 
3.3.1  Vertical tax interaction 
 
In both estimation methods, the federal tax rate is shown to have a significant positive effect on 
the provincial tax rate.  From a theoretical point of view, this would mean that provincial 
governments have more interest in preserving their revenues than their tax base, the former being 
the quantity of capital on their territory.  When the federal government increases its rate, 
provinces will tend to increase theirs to compensate the loss of revenues caused by the reduction 
of their tax base.  If on the other hand the federal rate decreases, provinces seem to put more 
emphasis on maintaining government’s revenues stable than preserving the tax base.  Economic 
theory is not clear about the sign that the coefficient should take, and according to Keen (1998), 
both possibilities are plausible depending on different factors. 
 
The positive interaction found in our two regressions is inconsistent however with Karkalakos 
and Kotsogiannis’ (2007) and Hayashi and Boadway’s (2001) results on corporate income tax.  
They found a negative relation for all the provinces with the federal government in fixing tax 
rates.  Their analyses were quite different though in various regards, including the period covered 
and the econometric methods.  Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001) found a positive relation 
between federal and provincial rates for personal income tax rates in Canada. 
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Table 8 – Estimation Results for PROVRATE regressions 
 
GLS 1st difference  DOLS 
Variable Coefficient            (z-statistic)  
Coefficient           
(z-statistic) 
FEDRATE 
0.3103827***          
(11.14)  
0.2686443***          
(7.04) 
COMPROV 
0.18628**            
(2.48)  
0.3214822***          
(3.82) 
EQUALIZATION 
0.0006045            
(0.39)  
0.0068209            
(1.62) 
FEDTRANSFERS (1 lag value) 
-0.0000121***         
(-2.58)  
-7.26e-06**           
(-2.18) 
INFLATION 
0.0378258            
(0.56)  
0.0005896            
(0.01) 
WAGES 
4.12e-06             
(1.25)  
7.93e-06***           
(3.86) 
GDP 
-2.99e-06***           
(-2.63)  
-3.70e-06***           
(-3.59) 
UNEMPL 
-0.0205219           
(-0.20)  
-.0672182            
(-1.07) 
 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.5, and 0.1 levels respectively 
Source: calculations by the author  
 
 
A positive relation has important concrete implications.  This would imply that the federal 
government may be able to partly compensate the loss in corporate income tax revenues from a 
decrease in its tax rate as the ensuing decrease in provincial rates would increase the size of the 
tax base.  Also, it is very useful for the central administration to fully understand how to affect 
the combined rate of taxation in Canada, since it is affected by the country-wide evolution of the 
tax base, both for revenues and capital attraction reasons.  If it has the will to encourage 
investment in the country, a coordinated effort in that direction seem much more easily 
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achievable than if provinces were responding with a increase in their rate.  This provincial 
increase would cancel at least partly federal efforts to reducing tax burden of businesses, and 
could even lead to an overall increase of the combined rates.  Nevertheless, the opposite is also 
true.  It makes it harder for federal government to increase its rate as a source of additional 
revenues since a subsequent increase in provincial rates minimize this gain because of the 
amplified negative effect on the tax base. 
 
 
3.3.2  Horizontal tax interaction 
 
Economic theory is much more defined and documented regarding horizontal tax interaction both 
between sub-national governmental entities and between countries.  Same level administrations 
tend to compete between themselves in fixing their tax rate to attract capital and prevent capital 
to flow out of their territory.  Our results are consistent with this assumption.  Both regressions 
show positive coefficients of interaction between Canadian provinces.  A decrease in another 
provinces’ tax rates impose downward pressure on a given provincial tax rate.  What is not clear 
though is whether horizontal interaction influences are relatively more important than vertical 
ones.  The first difference estimation reports a higher coefficient of reaction to a change in federal 
rate than competing provinces’ ones while the DOLS estimate shows the opposite.  We cannot 
compare however the two regressions on this point because both the interpretation and the 
estimation method are different. 
 
A comment concerning the preceding empirical studies mentioned before needs to be made.  
Unlike Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis, we have chosen not to make any assumption about a 
possible geographical proximity relation to construct our variable of competing provinces.  Our 
results are still conclusive about the existence of horizontal tax interaction, so it seems that even 
without the geographical dimension, there is still a significant link between the provinces’ tax 
rates.  This is an argument in favour of assuming a high mobility of capital, even though we 
cannot reject the existence of a geographical dimension to horizontal competition.  The methods 
we have chosen do not allow us to identify a particular relation within a group of provinces.  
Hayashi and Boadway (2001), using three sub-national players with a two-way interaction model, 
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were able to identify a specific interaction between Ontario and Quebec for example, and so were 
Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis (2007) in evaluating a distinct coefficient for each province.  We 
did not however risk disaggregating our sample to produce a coefficient for each province 
considering the small number of periods we use for each. 
 
 
3.3.3  Federal transfers and equalization 
 
As we said before, equalization payments are expected to affect tax rate setting in reducing the 
cost of increasing them.  We do not find a relation such that provinces receiving equalization 
entitlements tend to act differently in underestimating the cost of a reduction of their tax base.  
Calvolic and Day (2003) arrive at similar results studying specifically the “tax-back effect”.   
 
In the case of federal transfers, they seem to affect negatively and significantly provincial tax 
rates with a one period lag.  Those transfers received have an impact on provincial budgets of the 
following year and thus put downward pressure on governments need for other forms of 
revenues.  Like us, Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis (2007) have found a negative relationship 
between federal transfers with a lag and provincial tax rates.  They also found that preceding year 
equalization entitlements follow a similar dynamic.  We do not use values of equalization 
payments in our study but we can assume that, with one period lag, they have the same impact as 
other transfers. 
  
This is an interesting result if we consider how the variable FEDRATE influences the provincial 
rates.  Even though we did not study the direct relation between federal tax rate and federal 
transfers, we can easily consider the possibilities it brings to the federal government to pursue 
different goals.  Depending with what magnitude transfers and federal tax rate can affect 
provincial ones, a combination of those two variables can be a useful tool.  The loss of revenue 
for the federal government that results from fixing a lower tax rate could be compensated by 
lower transfers to provinces.  The provincial rates being positively related to variations in the 
federal tax rate, should lead, according to our results, to a lower combined rate with a minimized 
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loss for the federal government.  Provinces also benefit from the resulting larger tax base even if 
it is impossible for us to determine the net effect on their revenues. 
 
Of all the exogenous variables used in our model, only GDP shows a significant coefficient in 
both regressions and WAGES with the DOLS method.  The GDP has a negative impact on 
average effective provincial rates.  This can be explained by the important relationship of this 
variable with the tax base of a province.  The coefficient of WAGES, on the hand, shows a 
positive impact of this variable on PROVRATE.  A likely explanation would be that corporate 
profits are reduced when higher wages are paid.  Inflation rate and unemployment rate do not 
have a significant effect on provincial tax rates. 
 
 
3.3.4  Horizontal and vertical externalities 
 
In light of our results, we can assume the presence of horizontal externalities for Canadian 
provinces under the classic form.  Because of the mobility of the tax base, the cost of public 
collection of additional taxes from corporate income is higher than it would be without such 
competition.  The result of this dynamic is that all provinces are expected to set a lower tax rate 
than the optimal one where marginal cost of public found (MCPF) equal its marginal revenue in 
absence of tax competition. 
 
Under the assumption of vertical externalities, we consider the provincial tax rate to be higher 
than the optimal one because it does not take into account the pressure it creates on federal 
revenues in reducing the tax base.  If the federal government increases its rate, the provinces tend 
to increase their rates as well, to compensate the loss of revenues.  If provincial tax rates are too 
high, our results show that the federal government, being able to influence positively those rates, 
have a tool to minimize this kind of negative externalities in decreasing its own rate which would 
not be the case with a negative coefficient.  It is not clear which kind of pressure dominates the 
other, or which type of externality is the most important.  However, we know that the federal 
government has diminished its importance in the corporate income tax field over the years, so 
that vertical externalities have probably decreased as well. 
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SECTION IV. – CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this study, we searched for evidences in favour of vertical and horizontal tax interaction.  We 
attempt to establish the relationship between average effective corporate income tax rate both 
between the different provinces and between the federal government and the provinces.  By 
estimating this relationship, we can better evaluate the fiscal dynamic of the Canadian federation 
and have a better idea of how to manage policies considering the combined tax rate, which is the 
real factor that influences businesses’ decisions of investment.  We also tried to see the influence 
of federal transfers and equalization entitlements on the provinces fiscal policies concerning 
corporate income. 
 
We found evidences of horizontal competition between provinces.  The positive significant 
coefficients of interaction found in our two regressions shows that competition between the 
members of the federation put downward pressure on tax rates.  A province that wants to set a 
higher rate would see a part of its tax base flowing out of its borders.  Vertical interaction is 
shown to have a positive coefficient too.  Provinces tend to follow federal rate variations in fixing 
their own.  This would mean that they care more about preserving budget revenues than the size 
of their tax base.  This has important implications in how the central government can affect the 
global dynamic of the combined tax rates.  The relative magnitude of the two effects remains 
unknown. 
 
The dummy variable of equalization payments beneficiary revealed not to be conclusive.  No 
evidence was found that receiving equalization entitlements affect positively corporate income 
tax rate.  The magnitude of such payments is not considered in this study.  Current transfers from 
federal government negatively and significantly influence provincial tax rates of the following 
year.  Equalization might be considered as following the same pattern as federal transfers to 
provinces. 
 
Econometrical implementation imposed to deal with different problems.  Our main concern about 
non-stationarity in our data was managed by two different ways, first difference form and DOLS.  
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The later was used in light of our test results confirming the existence of a cointegration relation 
between tax variables, per capita GDP and per capita wages.  We were limited however in the 
number of lags we could use to perform that model due to our small time sample.  We dealt with 
other problems such as cross-sectional correlation, serial correlation and heteroskedasticity by 
using the Feasible Generalized Least Squares method.  No evidence was found of endogeneity 
problems for tax variables. 
 
Two main dimensions have to be considered for further research on the subject.  First, a 
weakness of our study his that it does not take into account the other part of governmental 
activity, the expenses.  The MCPF (Marginal Cost of Public Founds) on which fiscal externalities 
theory is based on have to take into account the marginal effect of public spending on 
productivity that affect businesses’ choices of investment location.  Dahly and Wilson (2003) 
offer a theoretical framework for such an approach where they consider public spending as a 
factor that can attract capital.  Empirical implementation of a similar model is not simple 
however but would certainly be of great interest. 
 
The second point is that we should treat those results with caution.  Many factors affect tax bases 
and thus average effective tax rates.  As  tax rates are used as proxies for the provincial 
government’s fiscal decisions, these external factors have to be isolated from the effects we 
search to evaluate.  Because nominal rates are stable through time, exogenous factors are likely to 
be important in average effective rate variations, even if those rates can also be affected by 
various other policies such as tax credits.  In this study, we found a significant impact of the 
variable GDP on provincial rates, which is closely related to tax bases, and thus is able to catch, 
at least in part, variations of the tax rates that are not related to government’s will.  Even with 
these results and all the particular care to problems in our data with econometrical 
implementation, we cannot conclude that external variations of tax base are not still important.   
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